This is a newsletter I create and share with my internal security team. Feel free to grab and do the same.
LNK Malware Strategies: Surge in Shortcut File Attacks
Unit 42 has detected a significant uptick in malicious use of Windows shortcut (LNK) files, with infections rising from approximately 21,100 in 2023 to over 68,400 in 2024. Their in-depth analysis of 30,000 samples highlights how attackers exploit the flexibility of LNK files to execute malware via four main techniques: exploit execution, file-on-disk execution, in-argument scripts, and overlay content.
Key Insights:
Exploit Delivery: Malicious LNK files leverage OS vulnerabilities to trigger payload execution directly when folders are opened.
File Execution: Attackers use LNK shortcuts to launch hidden executables or scripts residing on disk.
In-Argument Scripts: LNK files embed commands within their arguments, often invoking PowerShell or cmd.exe with encoded scripts for stealthy execution.
Overlay Payloads: Hidden payloads are appended to LNK files, with execution triggered via utilities like findstr, mshta, or PowerShell to extract and run embedded code.
Between March and April 2025, the rapid expansion in campaigns underscores the need for caution around downloading or opening unknown LNK files, especially those received via email or untrusted sources.
Further Reading: Unit 42
BERT Ransomware Hits Asia & Europe Across Multiple Platforms
Trend Micro researchers have identified BERT, a newly emerged ransomware group targeting organizations in Asia, Europe, and the U.S.—notably within healthcare, technology, and event services sectors. First observed in April 2025, BERT operates across both Windows and Linux environments and stands out for its streamlined execution and powerful impact despite a relatively simple codebase.
Key Insights:
Multi‑Platform Reach: BERT deploys across Windows and Linux systems. Windows attacks disable security tools and escalate privileges via PowerShell, while Linux variants operate with high parallelization—encrypting up to 50 threads and forcibly shutting down ESXi virtual machines to maximize impact.
Efficient Encryption Tactics: The ransomware halts critical processes, encrypts files quickly using AES, appends a .encrypted_by_bert extension, and drops ransom notes immediately.
Active Development & Russian Code Artifacts: Multiple variants have been identified, with code including Russian-language comments and hosted on Russian infrastructure—raising potential attribution links to Russia-aligned threat actors.
REvil Code Lineage: Analysts note similarities to the Linux variant of the now-dismantled REvil ransomware, suggesting BERT may be built using its leaked codebase.
Further Reading: Trend Micro Research
NordDragonScan: A Stealthy Data‑Harvester Targeting Windows
FortiGuard Labs recently uncovered NordDragonScan, a covert Windows infostealer silently dropped via HTA scripts. Once executed, the malware harvests documents, full browser profiles, screenshots, system details, and even network inventory before exfiltrating everything to a command-and-control server. Installation begins through deceptive RAR archives and LNK files that trigger mshta.exe, concealing activity behind a decoy Ukrainian-language document.
Key Insights:
Begins with a weaponized HTA dropped by a malicious LNK shortcut, leading to an invisible PowerShell installation of the payload.
NordDragonScan performs deep data collection, including documents (.docx, .pdf, .xls), screenshots, Chrome and Firefox history, system and network details.
Persistence is established via a Run-key registry entry; C2 communication occurs over TLS using custom headers (e.g. MAC-based user-agent).
Targets local network hosts for broader reconnaissance and evades static detection through string obfuscation and hidden executable tactics.
Further Reading: Fortinet
June 2025 Malware Spotlight: Discord Exploits Rise
Check Point Research’s June 2025 malware spotlight reveals an escalating threat vector: hijacked Discord invite links. Attackers are exploiting expired or deleted invite codes—especially vanity URLs—to redirect users into malicious servers. Over 1,300 victims globally have been impacted, with malware like AsyncRAT and Skuld Stealer delivered via trusted platforms such as GitHub, Pastebin, and Bitbucket.
Key Insights:
Hijacking Trusted Links: Threat actors reclaim expired or custom Discord invite links to lure users into malicious servers.
ClickFix Social Engineering: Victims encounter fake verification bots that execute clipboard injections and PowerShell commands.
Stealthy Delivery Chain: Malware is deployed in multiple stages using trusted cloud services to evade detection.
Widespread Impact: The campaign has affected users in the U.S., Vietnam, Germany, France, and the U.K., primarily targeting cryptocurrency users.
Further Reading: Check Point Research
Jasper Sleet: North Korean Remote IT Workers Use AI to Infiltrate Organizations
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a surge in activity from the North Korea-linked threat actor Jasper Sleet, formerly tracked as Storm‑0287. These operatives are exploiting remote work arrangements to embed themselves within organizations worldwide. Using AI tools to enhance fake identities, they are securing employment, gaining access to sensitive systems, and exfiltrating data to support North Korea’s strategic and financial objectives.
Key Insights:
Jasper Sleet operatives use AI for facial and voice modification to impersonate real job seekers.
Fake identities are supported by fabricated credentials, doctored online profiles, and complicit facilitators.
The campaign targets a wide range of industries across North America, Europe, and Asia.
Over 3,000 accounts have been suspended due to links to this operation.
Common tactics include the use of residential IPs, remote access software, and resume laundering.
Further Reading: Microsoft Security Blog
Preventing ClickFix Attacks: A Critical Playbook
Unit 42 outlines the growing prevalence of ClickFix social-engineering attacks—where users are duped into copying and executing malicious commands from deceptive web prompts. Given these attacks' reliance on clipboard manipulation and prompt hijacking (especially via PowerShell), defenders must adopt both technical and educational countermeasures.
Key Insights:
Clipboard Monitoring Defenses: Alerts should trigger when suspicious commands are copied, especially PowerShell scripts; clipboard activity monitoring complements traditional endpoint detection measures.
Restricting Shell Execution: Limit or disable mshta.exe, PowerShell, and cmd.exe execution unless explicitly required—and particularly from web-origin contexts—to reduce attack success rates.
Harden User Prompts: Implement policies to disable or neuter clipboard/paste functionality in browser environments vulnerable to web-based injection prompts.
User Education is Key: Train users to recognize fake CAPTCHAs and unusual ‘copy-and-paste’ prompts. Clear guidance—such as “never paste commands into system prompts”—can disrupt the attack lifecycle.
Further Reading: Unit 42
RenderShock: Weaponizing Trust in File Rendering Pipelines
Cybersecurity researchers at Cyfirma (with corroboration from IBM X-Force) have revealed a stealthy, zero-click attack strategy dubbed RenderShock. This sophisticated technique exploits passive file-rendering systems—like preview panes, metadata indexing, and sync clients—to discreetly trigger malicious activity without any user action.
Key Insights:
Zero-Click Payloads: Attackers embed malicious logic into document metadata, file previews, or automation workflows that execute when files are merely indexed or previewed—not opened.
Multi-Vector Exploits: The framework targets diverse surfaces like Windows Explorer preview panes, macOS Quick Look, email client renderers, cloud sync tools, and antivirus scanners to activate payloads.
Stealth & Modularity: RenderShock uses simple evasion tactics—like executing reverse-shell macros or NTLM beaconing via UNC paths—and also advanced payloads such as dual-format polyglots, remote Office templates, and poisoned EXIF metadata.
Wide Impact Potential: Capabilities range from reconnaissance and credential harvesting to remote execution and lateral movement, all without requiring user interaction.
Defense Strategies: Mitigation relies on disabling preview/indexing features, sandboxing file handling, blocking SMB egress, monitoring unusual network activity from renderer processes, and simulating RenderShock techniques in red team exercises.
Further Reading: Cyfirma
Gemini Email Summary Phishing: Invisible Prompt Injection Risk
A newly discovered vulnerability in Google’s Gemini for Workspace demonstrates how attackers can embed hidden instructions in emails—styled with invisible text—so that clicking “Summarize this email” invokes the malicious prompt. This can result in fake security alerts, phishing links, or fraudulent phone numbers appearing in AI-generated summaries.
Key Insights:
Attackers hide directives using invisible HTML/CSS that Gemini parses but users can’t see.
Summarized messages may falsely warn of compromised accounts and urge recipients to click links or call numbers.
Because there are no obvious phishing signals (like attachments or visible links), these emails bypass typical threat detection.
Security teams should flag summaries containing urgent calls to action and train users to verify full email content.
Further Reading: Bleeping Computer
Deepfake It ‘til You Make It: The New AI Criminal Toolset
Cybercriminals are increasingly exploiting deepfake technology to conduct fraud, extortion, and manipulation campaigns. Originally built for creative or entertainment purposes, AI-driven tools for generating fake audio, video, and images are now widely available and being misused to impersonate individuals and mislead organizations.
Key Insights:
Democratized Deepfake Creation: Tools for generating synthetic media are now easy to use, enabling low-skilled actors to produce realistic forgeries.
CEO Fraud & Recruitment Exploits: Deepfake audio and video are being used to impersonate executives during meetings or to create fake candidate profiles in hiring scams.
KYC & Identity Fraud Risks: Attackers use deepfakes to bypass identity verification processes at banks and fintech platforms, facilitating account fraud.
Plug-and-Play Underground: Criminal communities are sharing deepfake tools, tutorials, and services, lowering the barrier to entry for would-be attackers.
Further Reading: Trend Micro
PoisonSeed Bypasses FIDO Keys Using Cross‑Device Sign‑In Trick
Expel researchers uncovered a clever social engineering tactic used by the PoisonSeed campaign to neutralize FIDO hardware key protections. Instead of exploiting a technical flaw, attackers employ phishing pages and QR codes in a man-in-the-middle scenario that targets FIDO’s cross-device sign-in feature, fooling victims into granting access without physical key interaction.
Key Insights:
A phishing website mimicking Okta captures login credentials and forwards them to the legitimate portal.
It then prompts a cross-device sign-in, displaying a QR code that, when scanned by the user, inadvertently authenticates the attacker.
No vulnerability in FIDO itself is exploited; attackers manipulate design workflows to bypass multi-factor authentication.
Although FIDO keys remain strong, this tactic bypasses them in real time without user awareness.
Organizations should monitor for unexpected cross-device login requests and consider options like requiring Bluetooth proximity or restricted registration policies.
Further Reading: Expel
SLOW#TEMPEST Malware Spotlight: Advanced Obfuscation Techniques Unveiled
Unit 42 has analyzed a recent variant of the SLOW#TEMPEST malware campaign, revealing sophisticated obfuscation—such as dynamic jumps and indirect function calls—used by threat actors to hinder both static and dynamic analysis.
Key Insights:
Control-Flow Obfuscation: The loader DLL uses runtime-calculated jumps (JMP RAX) to scramble execution paths, making conventional CFG analysis unreliable.
Indirect Calls: Instead of direct API calls, SLOW#TEMPEST employs dynamically resolved function pointers (CALL RAX), complicating detection of malicious functionality.
Emulation-Based Deobfuscation: Researchers successfully reversed obfuscation by emulating dynamic jumps and calls in IDA Pro, restoring visibility into the control flow and API usage.
Evasion of Sandboxes: These techniques prevent decompilers and automated sandboxes from recognizing malicious behavior, allowing the malware to remain hidden and active.
Detection Takeaway: Security teams should enhance defenses with emulation, behavioral telemetry, and control-flow integrity mechanisms to detect threats that evade traditional signature-based analysis.
Further Reading: Unit 42
Matanbuchus Malware Delivered via Microsoft Teams Calls
Security researchers have alerted to a targeted campaign where attackers exploit Microsoft Teams voice calls—impersonating IT support—to remotely deploy Matanbuchus 3.0 malware. Victims are persuaded to use Windows Quick Assist, opening remote access doors. A PowerShell script then deploys a malicious ZIP package containing a side-loaded DLL loader, which initiates memory-resident infection without leaving obvious traces.
Key Insights:
Social Engineering via Teams: Callers pose as IT personnel to earn trust and initiate remote-control sessions.
Quick Assist Abuse: Remote assistance tools are misused to bypass controls and execute malicious scripts.
In-Memory Loader: The malware uses PowerShell to unpack a DLL loader that sideloads the final payload without disk artifacts.
Advanced Evasion: Version 3.0 introduces Salsa20-based encryption, syscall usage to evade EDR hooks, and anti-sandbox mechanisms.
High-Risk Payload: Matanbuchus 3.0 can deploy additional threat tools like Cobalt Strike and ransomware, providing full system control.
Further Reading: Bleeping Computer
FileFix: A Social Engineering Evolution of ClickFix
Check Point Research has uncovered FileFix, a new social engineering attack that refines the ClickFix method to trick users into executing malicious commands. Delivered through compromised or typo-squatted websites, FileFix prompts victims with a fake download link or “Fix” button—copying harmful PowerShell scripts to the clipboard. When users paste and run these snippets, the attacker gains system access through a stealthy, multi-stage infection chain.
Key Insights:
FileFix uses clipboard hijacking to push malicious payloads via user-initiated paste actions.
Fake prompts mimic legitimate "fix" or software update buttons to build trust.
Infection unfolds in stages—from initial PowerShell downloaders to final payloads like AsyncRAT or remote access trojans.
This variation simplifies and accelerates command execution compared to previous ClickFix variants.
Detection requires user awareness and endpoint policies that block shell execution from clipboard content.
Further Reading: Check Point Research
Linkable Token Identifiers Now GA for Enhanced Identity Threat Detection
Microsoft Entra ID has launched linkable token identifiers—a new capability that allows security teams to trace a user session across Microsoft 365 services (including Teams, SharePoint, Exchange Online, and Graph). Each session is now tagged with a Session ID (SID) and Unique Token Identifier (UTI), enabling precise correlation of all actions originating from a single authentication event across multiple workloads.
Key Insights:
SID enables linkage of all access tokens and session activity from one login, while UTI uniquely identifies each issued token.
Security analysts can now trace attacker movements—such as lateral access, API usage, or mailbox actions—across services using unified session tracking.
This simplifies investigation workflows, reducing reliance on fragmented logs or inconsistent identifiers like IP addresses and device IDs.
SOCs using Defender XDR and Entra ID Protection can now map anomalous activity with greater accuracy and speed.
Further Reading: Microsoft Entra Blog
FBI & CISA Update on Tactics & Threats for Scattered Spider
Critical infrastructure and commercial entities are urged to review CISA's updated joint advisory AA23‑320A (last revised July 29, 2025), detailing evolving tactics used by the Scattered Spider cybercriminal group. Known for preying on IT and help desk personnel, this financially motivated threat actor now combines social engineering, ransomware, and data extortion with sophisticated new techniques.
Key Insights:
Scattered Spider continues targeting IT support channels using voice phishing (vishing), SMS phishing (smishing), and MFA fatigue attacks alongside SIM swapping to obtain access credentials.
Once inside, attackers repurpose legitimate remote-access and tunneling tools (e.g. TeamViewer, AnyDesk, Ngrok) instead of relying on malware, enabling stealthy and persistent access.
New variants like DragonForce ransomware are now being deployed as part of combined extortion operations (data theft + encryption).
In recent operations, actors have refined social engineering methods while rotating TTPs to evade detection and extend dwell time.
Updated mitigations emphasize phishing-resistant MFA, verifying helpdesk contacts out-of-band, limiting remote access tool use, and continuous validation of security controls against evolving attack behaviors.
Further Reading: CISA Advisory AA23‑320A (Scattered Spider)
Phishing Trends Q2 2025: Microsoft at the Helm, Spotify Rejoins the Spotlight
Check Point Research’s latest Brand Phishing report reveals that in the second quarter of 2025, cybercriminals continued to impersonate high-trust brands to trick users into revealing credentials or financial data. Microsoft remained the most spoofed brand—used in 25% of phishing attempts—followed by Google (11%), Apple (9%), and Spotify (6%), marking Spotify’s first reappearance in the charts since late 2019.
Key Insights:
Microsoft led phishing campaigns, accounting for a quarter of all spoofed brands.
Spotify saw a surprising resurgence in impersonation attempts after a long absence, used in campaigns involving fake credential and payment pages.
Booking.com–themed domains surged by over 700 in Q2, many embedding personal user data to deceive targets convincingly.
Tech remained the top spoofed sector, with social networks, travel, and retail brands also seeing elevated impersonation activity.
Seasonal alignment played a key role: the rise in travel scams coincided with summer holiday planning, amplifying phishing success.
Further Reading: Check Point Research
Microsoft OAuth Phishing Campaign: MFA Bypass via App Impersonation
Proofpoint has exposed a sophisticated phishing campaign where attackers used malicious Microsoft OAuth applications—disguised as trusted brands like Adobe, DocuSign, and SharePoint—to trick users into granting access to their Microsoft 365 accounts. These apps operated within legitimate authorization flows, enabling attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) with minimal-risk consent requests.
Key Insights:
The fake OAuth apps mimicked trusted publishers to obtain permissions for profile, email, and openid scopes—enough to capture credentials and session tokens without raising suspicion.
Once approved, users were redirected to phishing pages that intercepted login credentials and session tokens using AiTM (attacker-in-the-middle) kits like Tycoon or EvilProxy.
Attackers were able to maintain access via stolen tokens even after password resets, remaining linked to accounts until consent was manually revoked.
The campaign compromised multiple sectors—including finance, healthcare, and retail—targeting executives and high-privilege users.
Standard security controls such as DMARC or domain reputation were largely ineffective since the phishing originated from within Microsoft's system.
Microsoft is rolling out updated defaults that require administrative approval for third-party app permissions, aiming to limit similar attacks going forward.
Further Reading: Proofpoint Threat Insight
GreyNoise: Early Warning Signals Reveal Emerging Vulnerabilities Before Public Disclosure
GreyNoise’s latest research, “Early Warning Signals: When Attacker Behavior Precedes New Vulnerabilities”, demonstrates that spikes in malicious activity—such as scanning or brute force attempts—often occur weeks before a corresponding CVE is officially disclosed. This pattern is most pronounced in edge technologies like VPNs, firewalls, and remote access tools. Of 216 observed spikes since September 2024, 80% were followed by a CVE within six weeks, and 50% within just three weeks.
Key Insights:
Attacker reconnaissance frequently precedes public identification of the vulnerability they are probing.
Spikes in exploit activity offer a critical 6-week window for defenders to prepare before official disclosure.
This trend is particularly prevalent in enterprise perimeter devices—typical initial access points for adversaries.
Relying solely on EPSS or KEV can miss these pre-disclosure threats and delay defensive response.
Further Reading: GreyNoise Early Warning Signals Report